Inga-Lill Elton v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
Inga-Lill Elton v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Rawlings, Roberts & Black; Attorneys for RespondentDon J.
Hanson; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Elton v. Bankers Life, No. 12993 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3274
IN 1HE SUPREME COURT 
OF 1HE 











BRIEF OF APPE'LLANT 
Appeal from Judgment of the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake Oounty, State of Ut.ah 
Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge 
HANSON & GARRETT 
DON J. HANSON 
520 Continental Bank Buildfne · 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys fM A~ 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
Suit,e 400, Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respqrul,cn,t 
; FI t ED 
NOV 3 1971 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN DOWER COURT -------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------ 2 
POINT I. 
THE POLICY IN THE PRESENT CASE 
CLEARLY REQUIRES THAT THE IN-
SURED MUST DIE AS A RESULT OF 
AN ACCIDENTAL BODILY INJURY ________________ 23 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE EL-
TON'S DEATH WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL 
BECAUSE IT WAS FORESEEABLE 
AND NOT UNEXPECTED ____________________________ 34 - 35 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF JUDGE ELTON'S DEATH WAS 
"ACCIDENTAL," RECOVERY MUST BE 
DENIED BECAUSE DISEASE, NOT AC-
CIDENT, WAS THE PREDOMINANT 
CA USE OF HIS DEATH ----------------------------------40 - 41 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE CON-
TRADICTORY AND FAILED TO FAIR-
LY PRESENT THE ISSUES TO THE 
JURY TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT ---------------------------------------------------------- 49 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 55 
CASES CITED 
Alessandro v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance 
Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 000 ( 1965) _________________________________ -43, 44 
Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
New York, 106 Utah 184,, 147 P.2d 319, 
152 A.L.R. 1278 (1944) ______________________________ 27, 29, 36, 38 
Herthel v. Time Insurance Company, 
221 Wis. 208, 265 N.W. 575 (1936) -------------------------- 42 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued 
Kellogg v. California Western States Life 
Insurance Company, 114 Utah 567, 
Page ' 
201 p .2d 949 ( 1949) ------------------------------------------------37, 54 
Lee v. New York Life Insurance Company, 
95 Utah 445, 82 P .2d 178 ( 1938) -------------------------------- 45 
McMartin v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York 
264 N.Y. 220, 190 N.E. 415 (1934) ---------------------------- 31 
Murasky v. Com'mercial Travelers Mutual Acc. 
Ass'n. of America, 94 F .2d 578 ( 1938) ____________________ 44 
Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, 
58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 ( 1921) ____________________________ 24, 35 
Thompson v. American Casualty Company, 
20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276 (1968) ------------------------ 27 
Tomaiuoli v. United States FideUty and Guaranty 
Company, 75 N.J. Super. 192, 182 A.2d 582 -------------- 41 
Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Company, 
107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173 (1945) ---------------------------- 45 
Whwteott v. Continental Casualty Company, 
85 Utah 406, 39 P .2d 733 ( 1935) ·---------------------------36, 38 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Couch on Insurance, 2d Section 15 :37 -------------------------------- 29 
Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section 41 :380 ---------------------------- 32 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAI-1 
INGA-LILL ELTON, 
vs. 






BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12993 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit on a group accident insurance pol-
icy covering State employees. The plaintiff, Inga-Lill 
Elton, is the beneficiary of a $100,000.00 policy on 
the life of the late Judge Leonard W. Elton and is 
suing for the policy amount because of the alleged 
accidental death of Leonard W. Elton on May 13, 
1970. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before a jury which returned 
a verdict for plaintiff on April 12, 1972. Judgment 
was entered on May 1, 1972, and defendant's Motion 
For New Trial was denied by the Court on June 28, 
1972. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a directed verdict or, in the al-
ternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, Inga-
Lill Elton, the beneficiary on a policy of insurance 
designated as Special Risk Group Policy No. SR. 
82508 issued to the State of Utah and covering the 
employees of said State (R. 1 through R. 6). The 
pertinent parts of the policy provide: 
The Company certifies that the Employee 
to whom this certificate is issued (hereinafter 
called the Insured Person) is insured under 
the above group policy against injury sustain-
ed by the Insured Person, or the Insured Per-
son's dependents, if insured hereunder (here-
inafter called Insured Dependents) . Coverage 
is effective on the first day of the first month 
for which premiums are paid through payroll 
deductions as evidence by the records of the 
Employer. 
'Injury' wherever used in this certificate 
means bodily injury occurring while the Group 
Policy is in force as to the Insured Person or 
Insured Dependent whose injury is the basis 
of claim and causing the loss directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes and effected sole-
ly through an accidental bodily injury to the 
Insured Person or Insured Dependent. 
BENEFICIARY 
Loss, if any, as respects accidental death 
only shall be payable to thP- person designated 
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in writing and on file with the Employer. If a 
beneficiary designation has not been made then 
loss will be payable to the Estate of the Insured 
Person. All other indemnities are payable to 
the Insured Person. The Employee will be the 
Beneficiary of the dependents coverage. 
* * * * 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH, DISMEMBER-
MENT AND PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABLEMENT INDEMNITY 
When injury to the Insured Person or In-
sured Dependent results in loss within One 
Hundred and Eighty days after the date of the 
accident the Company will pay, based on the 
Principal Sum as stated in the Schedule and 
applicable to the person whose injury is the 
basis of claim, for 
Loss of Life ________________ The Principal Sum 
It is admitted by the defendant's Answer that 
the plaintiff is the wife of the deceased, Leonard W. 
Elton, who died on or about May 13, 1970, and is the 
beneficiary designa:ted by the deceased pursuant to 
the terms of the insurance policy ref erred to herein. 
It is further admitted that said policy was in full 
force and effect at the time Leonard W. Elton died 
(R. 1-2 and 15). It is denied that Leonard W. Elton 
died as a result of injury as that term is defined by 
the policy (R.1and15). 
Leonard W. Elton practiced law in Salt Lake 
City since before World War II (R. 289). He was 
appointed a District Judge in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict in 1966 (R. 172). On February 4, 1954, Leon-
ard W. Elton went to Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple, a 
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specialist in internal medicine, for a routine physical 
examination. As part of that examination an elec-
trocardiogram was done which showed that Leonard 
Elton had at some time prior suffered a heart attack. 
He had damage to the heart muscle which, in the opin-
ion of the doctor, was probably of long standing (R. 
316). Dr. Dalrymple did not see Leonard Elton again 
until he saw him in the St. Mark's Hospital on Jan-
uary 9, 1969. At that time Leonard Elton had been 
admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital by one of the col-
leagues of the doctor and had suffered a stroke ( R. 
319). Dr. Dalrymple's definition of a stroke was as 
follows: 
Something happens to a blood vessel. As a 
result the blood supply is interrupted, and the 
tissue dies, just like you tie a string around 
your finger, it gets white and sore. This hap-
pens in the head. It all depends on what hap-
pens, if it hits a vulnerable area in the base of 
the brain it will kill you instantly. If it hits 
one side, it may affect and impair the other 
side. It all depends on where this vessel is dam-
aged in the head as to what happens. So briefly 
a stroke is a damage to the nervous system. 
(R. 316) 
In his opinion Leonard Elton had suffered dam-
age to the brain in the back of the head, that part 
known as the cerebellum and the part which is con-
cerned with balance (R. 320). Leonard Elton re-
mained in the hospital until January 17, 1969. The 
treatment consisted of trying to increase the blood 
supply to his brain and keeping him from getting 
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complications, which would be pneumonia, paralysis, 
trouble with the urinary tract and that sort of thing 
( R. 320). As a result of the stroke Leonard Elton 
suffered from emotional change and stress and had 
difficulty balancing. He had no definite paralysis but 
his speech was slow at times ( R. 322). After his re-
lease from the hospital, Dr. Dalrymple saw Leonard 
Elton on March 4, 1969, at which time he was making 
satisfactory progress. He was told to get rest and to 
take a medication designed to increase blood supply 
to his brain ( R. 322) . He was seen again on April 
1, 1969, at which time Leonard Elton had returned 
to part-time work. The doctor continued to see him 
through the rest of the year during which time Leon-
ard Elton apparently made satisfactory progress, re-
turning to full-time employment on October 3, 1969 
( R. 324). He was told to go ahead and do his work 
as long as he was able to but if he got overtired or 
overstressed to let the doctor know. On April 20, 1970, 
Leonard Elton came into the doctor's office for an 
eye infection and regular check-up at which time the 
medicine for the circulation was reduced because he 
seemed to be doing quite satisfactory. The next day, 
April 21st, Leonard Elton's wife brought him back 
into the office because he had suffered a sudden onset 
of dizziness. He was cold and clammy and had an 
astigmatism (blurred vision), which implies some-
thing wrong at the base of the brain. In the doctor's 
opinion he had suffered another stroke. (R. 325). 
The doctor suggested Leonard go to the hospital, but 
he elected to stay home. Leonard suffered another 
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spell on the 28th of April (R. 326). At that time Dr. 
Dalrymple did not see him but did change his medica-
tion because in his words, ''I knew he was in for 
trouble." (R. 326). Dr. Dalrymple saw Leonard 
again in the office on the 2nd of May, 1970. Dr. Dal-
rymple said he didn't have any definite localizing 
signs that he had had a stroke in the sense that he 
could tell just where it was but that he knew from his 
behavior and attitude that something had happened 
to him that wasn't good (R. 326). He saw him again 
on the 9th of May, 1970, to check his condition, hav-
ing heard from Leonard's wife that he had had some 
trouble between the 2nd and 9th. He stated he was 
surprised that Elton was in very good shape (R. 
327). The next time Dr. Dalrymple saw him was on 
May 13, 1970, at the St. Mark's Hospital. At that 
time Leonard was unconscious, extremely weak, 
sweating, blue, he had been sick, and his clinical pic-
ture was that of a terminal condition (R. 328). As 
to his cause of death, the doctor defined the immedi-
ate cause as circulatory collapse which in turn was 
caused by damage to his brain which in turn was 
caused by the process which caused him to have the 
stroke ( R. 329). In describing how this occurs, the 
doctor testified : 
Well, what happens is that people have 
hard arteries, and when these arteries plug up 
or get plugged, either something in the mid-
dle of the artery gets loose and flies in there 
and plugs it off, or comes from some distant 
point, or it could be infection such as we fl!-en-
tioned with the stiff neck where the patient 
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might have had meningitis, which is some-
thing we had to consider, the vessels become 
plugged, the series of events which I mention-
ed earlier, withuut the blood supply the tissue 
died. In this case the tissue died. There was 
swelling, the brain became swollen, pushed it 
down in the little thing in the back of the neck, 
and this caused the spinal cord to swell and all 
the vital centers were just destroyed. ( R. 330). 
After Leonard Elton's death, an autopsy was 
done, the results of which were reviewed by Dr. Dal-
rymple. On the basis of that autopsy, Dr. Dalrymple 
said that the heart attack in 1954 had been caused by 
what is termed a "myocardial infarct" (R. 322), 
which like the stroke had been brought about by the 
progression of the arteriosclerosis to the point where 
it had closed the artery leading to the heart, and that 
part of the heart fed by that artery had actually died 
( R. 333) . The doctor further found that clots had 
been found in the spleen and the kidney which had also 
been caused by small bodies traveling through the ar-
tery clogging the artery in the same manner as the 
stroke ( R. 340) . He was of the opinion that the em-
boli which clogged the artery in the kidney and 
spleen came from the heart (R. 342) but that in the 
case of the stroke the emboli came off of the sides of 
one of the blood vessels and traveled to the brain ( R. 
342). As to the cause of the underlying condition of 
arteriosclerosis, the doctor testified that the causes 
of that condition are hereditary, diet, lack of exer-
cise, and he further testified the personality of the 
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individual involved would be a contributing factor. 
In that respect he said: 
[A]n~ the group at the Zion Hospital in 
San Francisco has done a lot of work in this. 
In fact, there are a bunch of cardiologists in 
Burbank who have made reports in the liter-
ature since 1969 about the effects of person-
ality and stress and are saying that cholesterol 
fatty acids of all kinds, tobacco, and certain of 
these fat analysis we run now are not impor-
tant, it is the personality the individual has 
this effect. Some people smoke and get it, oth-
ers don't. The same with alcohol (R. 336, 37). 
He further testified that if a person had arteri-
osclerosis to the extent that Leonard Elton had it, 
this is a continuing thing and the condition pro-
gresses (R. 342-343). From the time he saw Leon-
ard Elton in January of 1969 until he died he never 
released Leonard from his care ( R. 354-355) testify-
ing that anybody who has a stroke is a sick person and 
should be observed. He was afraid because of his per-
sonality that he might have another stroke, and he 
hoped he could prevent one ( R. 355) . He realized 
that the factor which had caused the stroke in 1969 
was still present in his body, and he was likely to have 
another stroke in the future. Given the conditions he 
found at the autopsy and Leonard Elton's heart con-
dition, it was surprising to him that he survived as 
long as he did (R. 361). 
District Judge Frank Wilkins testified that in 
January of 1970 Leonard was appointed Presiding 
Judge of the Third Judicial District. This position is 
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a rotating position which is generally held for a six 
month period by one of the ten judges assigned to the 
District (R. 178). The position involved supervision 
over the court calendar, assignments, personnel, 
press matters, and the assignment of cases with con-
stitutional issues or of great public interest ( R. 17 4) . 
The judge usually worked from 8 :30 a.m. until 5 :00 
p.m. each day (R. 174) and would frequently take 
work home at night (R. 176). However, there is noth-
ing unusual about the position. It is just part of being 
a District Judge ( R. 182). Nor was there anything 
unusual, according to Judge Wilkins, about judges 
working from 8 :30 to 5 :00 (R. 182). In fact, the 
position of the Presiding Judge has the advantage 
that he can assign the difficult cases to another judge 
(R. 185). 
On March 26, 1970, another judge in the District 
disqualified himself from a case known as the "Clark 
Ronnow case" which involved a public official charg-
ed with the misuse of funds ( R. 197) . The matter 
was referred to Judge Elton, as Presiding Judge, for 
re-assignment. Mr. Ronnow had pleaded guilty to one 
count; it was still necessary for a judge to impose sen-
tence 'On this charge and rule on the District Attor-
ney's Motion To Dismiss the other six counts of the 
charge ('R. 201). A large amount of publicity accom-
panied all stages of the proceeding ( R. 202) . It was 
customary for such cases to be transferred to a judge 
from another Distirct (R. 205) but Judge Elton de-
cided to handle the matter himself ( R. 204). During 
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the time that Judge Elton was associated with the case 
he received telephone calls ( R. 204) which upset him 
(R. 297). On April 6th Judge Elton held a one hour 
hearing on the Ronnow case in which he passed sen-
tence and dismissed the other six counts. He continu-
ed to receive harassing telephone calls on the Ronnow 
case for approximately two weeks after the sentenc-
ing (R. 297). 
Judge Elton also undertook to handle litigation 
concerning the Sunday Closing Law which was filed 
on April 6, 1970, and referred to Judge Elton :for as-
signment because it involved the constitutionality of 
a law and attracted great public interest. The first 
hearing was on April 16, 1970, in which one store 
sought a temporary injunction against thirteen other 
stores ( R. 245) , and it took one hour in court ( R. 
246). Judge Elton consolidated all these Sunday 
Closing Law cases for a hearing on the law's consti-
tutionality. The Judge made himself available in 
Chambers for consultation for four or five hours on 
April 24th (Arbor Day, a State holiday) while the 
attorneys decided on the best method for proceeding 
with the case (R. 235). Judge Elton appeared drawn 
and haggard and looked tired at a hearing on May 6, 
1970 (R. 239). Newsmen and attorneys not formal-
ly connected with the case were frequently seeking 
audiences with Judge Elton during this period of 
time (R. 275). The Judge was also handling other 
matters at this time (R. 276, 277). People who saw 
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Judge Elton daily testified that he seemed to be more 
tired during the middle of April than he had previ-
ously been (R. 207, 227, 239, 254, 261, 269, 276, 
289). In preparation for the case, Judge Elton 
started spending evenings and weekends researching 
the constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws, and 
was also skipping his lunches to conduct research. 
The plaintiff, Inga-Lill Elton, wife of Leonard 
W. Elton, was not aware of Dr. Dalrymple's finding 
that Leonard Elton had had a heart attack prior to 
1954 ( R. 307) and testified that he had had good 
health up until the time of his first stroke in January 
of 1969 ( R. 293). After that stroke she testified that 
his health appeared to improve until April of 1970, 
although he did have some impairment but he had 
really started to overcome this ( R. 295). On April 
21, 1970, he complained of dizzy spells, a:t which point 
she took him to the doctor who told Leonard that he 
was working too hard and that he would have to slow 
down (R. 299). On April 28th he had a real dizzy 
spell. Upon the advice of Dr. Dalrymple he stayed 
home for the rest of that week. On the evening of May 
5, 1970, the Judge went to bed early and Mrs. Elton 
found him staring blankly when she looked in on him 
at 11 :00 p.m. Mrs. Elton found that he had complete-
ly lost his memory. She and their children talked to 
him until about 3 :00 o'clock a.m. when Mrs. Elton 
gave him a sleeping pill on Dr. Dalrymple's advice 
and put him to bed ( R. 302, 303) . The Judge had re-
f ained his memory when he woke up the next morn-
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ing ( R. 303). He went to court and heard oral argu-
ments on the Sunday Closing Law from 10 :00 
a.m. until 12 :00 noon and then from 2 :00 p.m. 
until 5 :00 p.m. (R. 238. Six briefs had pre-
viously been submitted to the Judge (R. 236) 
on this matter. According to an attorney who par-
ticipated, Judge Elton seemed alert and asked in-
telligent questions during the morning session but 
looked tired, asked few questions, and his mind seem 
ed to wander in the afternoon (R. 239). Pursuant to 
the doctor's orders Judge Elton stayed home for the 
rest of the week (R. 304). On May 12th Judge Elton 
appeared very tired to his wife (R. 305) and the two 
attorneys who dealt with him (R. 240, 290). He made 
a one-sentence announcement of his decision on the 
Sunday Closing Law ( R. 240), handled two default 
divorces, and spent the rest of the day trying a boun-
dary dispute ( R. 279). The stroke occurred at 8 :30 
a.m. the following morning, and Judge Elton was 
rushed to the St. Mark's Hospital where he died at 
approximately 10 :45 a.m. (R. 328). 
Mrs. Elton further testified that in each instance 
Judge Elton's difficulty occurred while he was relax-
ed or resting. The stroke in January of 1969 occurred 
in the evening ( R. 308). The Judge had come home 
from work and had said he was very tired and had 
gone to bed. He had suffered a stroke when she re-
turned from the store about 8 :30 or 9 :00 p.m. 
The stroke of April 21st (or dizzy spell as Mrs. 
Elton chose to call it) occurred at 9 :00 o'clock in the 
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morning following a period when Judge Elton had 
had a night's rest (R. 309); and on May 5th when 
the Judge appeared disoriented, this occurred at 3 :00 
a.m. after the Judge had been in bed for some time; 
and the final stroke of May 13, 1970, occurred after 
the Judge had had a full night of sleep and had decid-
ed to stay home from work for an extra hour. None 
of these episodes occurred following a time of excite-
ment when the Judge was aroused or doing any phys-
ical exertion or anything of that nature and from 
sometime in April going on until the time of his death 
Judge Elton appeared to be getting more and more 
tired and dragging ( R. 312) and gray and ashen. 
He became more withdrawn and moody and toward 
the end (according to Mrs. Elton) was really ragged 
(R. 313). Following Judge Elton's death, on May 14, 
1970 an autorsy was performed at the St. Mark's Hos-
pital by Drs. Robert Stewart and Shelley A. Swift. 
Dr. Swift, a Board Certified pathologist, was called 
as a witness. He testified that pathology is mainly the 
study of causation of disease and mechanisms pro-
ducing death ( R. 424) and that the primary purpose 
of performing an autopsy is to determine the cause 
of death (R. 425). In Judge Elton's case he found a 
healed infarction of the heart with an aneurysm for-
mation, emphysema and congestion in his lungs, a 
healed infarct in the spleen, a healed infarct in the 
kidneys, and evidence of an old and recent infarction 
in the brain ( R. 427). He also had general arterios-
clerosis involving most of the vessels including the 
aorta, the heart and the brain. In addition, stones 
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were found in his gall bladder. He defined an infarct 
as an obstruction in one of the arteries leading to an 
organ, as a result of which the area supplied by the 
artery will die as a result of lack of oxygen and nutri-
tion. He defined an aneurysm as a dilatation and 
went on to say: 
... And in the heart, when you have an 
infarct there, the heart is continually under 
pressure as the heart contract. And since the 
wall is weak, every time the heart contracts, 
there is a tendency for this scar tissue to 
stretch. And over a period of years the scar 
tissue will stretch and form a sac of scar tissue 
which is called an aneurysm of the heart. (R. 
427). 
As to the effect this will have on the circulation, 
he testified : 
Well, whenever you have an aneurysm 
present, the contracting of the heart is ex-
tremely inefficient, because the part of the 
heart that's involved by the aneurysm cannot 
contract, and therefore all of the blood that is 
in the aneurysmal sac stays there with each 
contraction rather than being expelled out as a 
normal heart would do, only part of the blood 
in the heart is expelled, and part remains with 
each contraction, so that it is very inefficient 
contraction. 
He defined arteriosclerosis as a process which 
takes place in the arteries primarly involving the de-
position of fat substances in the wall of the artery. In 
addition, there is a calcification which is considered 
secondary. The primary change is the deposition of 
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fat in the wall of the artery (R. 428). In Judge El-
ton's case this condition was most marked in the heart 
and the brain. We further find this as a progressive 
sort of disease ( R. 429) . As to the cause, he testified: 
Well, the entire cause isn't known forcer-
tain, but there are many things known to pre-
dispose arteriosclerosis. In the first place, ar-
teriosclerosis involves everybody to some ex-
tent, but many people it is very mild and 
causes no trouble until quite late in life. But in 
many people it occurs quite early in life, and 
these people have a metabolic abnormality of 
the fat metabolism which predisposes to depo-
sition of this lipid material in the arteries. So 
probably the most important cause is heredity. 
If you are born with a defect in fat metabolism, 
this is probably the most important single 
cause of it. 
The next most important cause is diet it-
self. And diet in a person that is not involved 
with a metabolic defect has relatively little ef-
fect on arteriosclerosis. But if you have a dia-
betic - I mean a metabolic defect, then diet is 
extremely important, and predisposes to arter-
iosclerosis. There are some other factors that 
tend to aggravate it like high blood pressure 
tends to promote arteriosclerosis, but these are 
the chief factors. ( R. 429 and 430). 
In Dr. Swift's opinion there was no question that 
Judge Elton, having had a heart attack at 43 years of 
age, had a metabolic defect and that this was one of 
the causes of his condition. In his opinion the immedi-
1' ate cause of Leonard Elton's death was cerebral in-
farction or stroke. The occlusion caused a large area 
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of the brain to lose its vitality and cease to function, 
and this together with the swelling of the tissues 
around the involved area produced death involving 
the vital centers. As to the source of the emboli which 
caused the occlusion in Judge Elton's case, the wit-
ness testified it could have formed in the heart and 
traveled to the brain, or it could have formed in the 
vessel which supplied the area. He further 
testified that the under 1 yin g cause of 
both the heart con di ti on and the stroke or cer-
ebral infarct was the underlying condition of 
arteriosclerosis. He testified that a person 
with the condition found in Leonard Elton's heart 
would become progressively more prone to thrombo-
sis because of more inefficiency in circulation and 
that when it reached a point of shock there would be 
poor oxygenation in the blood, the person would be 
ashen in color and would tend to be tired ( R. 436) . 
As to whether or not stress might cause injury, the 
doctor testified that it would depend upon whether 
or not the stress was pathologic stress. Anything 
which will produce fear will produce stress. The rea-
son for this is that the body has built in a 
reaction to protect the body aginst harm. So 
any type of psychologic stress which produces 
stress reaction, shock, anything that will pro-
duce shock like blood loss, burns, physical trauma, 
damage to the tissue, this produces pathologic stress 
reaction (R. 438). Increased physical activity does 
not produce a pathologic stress reaction nor would an 
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increased work load produce an injury to the organs 
of the body (R. 439 and 440). The fact that Leonard 
Elton was acting as Presiding Judge, trying law-
suits, and handled some sensitive matters would not, 
in the doctor's opinion, produce pathologic stress. 
The plaintiff produced Dr. Clyde Null whose 
specialty was internal medicine and cardiovascular 
disease. He did not see Judge Elton personally but 
testified upon the basis of the hospital records, in-
cluding the autopsy report ( R. 364, 365). He testi-
fied that Judge Elton had had a previous myocardial 
infarct, an infarct in the spleen, one in the kidney 
and in the brain and although the emboli which caus-
ed the particular infarct may have come from differ-
ent sources, either the wall of a vessel or the heart it-
self ( R. 380) , the mechanics of injury in each in-
stance were the same, that of tissue dying as a result 
of an inadequate blood supply to that particular piece 
of tissue ( R. 381). At one point in the record he felt 
the basic cause of Leonard Elton's death was cerebral 
vascular disease (R. 389) resulting in a cerebral vas-
cular accident (R. 388) which he defined as: 
It is a steady progression of disease which 
is altered by certain factors as was stated. The 
common medical term for this is a cerebral vas-
cular accident. 
He at one point in the record did state that the 
work which Leonard Elton was doing at the time of 
his death would markedly aggravate his cerebral vas-
cular disease ( R. 377). He explained this by saying: 
There is a great wealth of clinical infor-
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mation to indicate that individuals who have 
arteriosclerosis who are placed under chronic 
stress tend to do - tend to have a much in-
creased risk of having strokes, heart attacks, 
and that sort of thing, simply from the fact 
that stress aggravates arteriosclerosis. There 
is excellent medical information to indicate 
this on a variety of principles involved, not 
necessarily just in producing a blood clot, but 
changing the basic blood flow patterns, chang-
ing the oxygen requirements. Strokes are not 
just the consequence of a blocked blood vessel, 
they are the consequence of many, many little 
factors involved in the tissue and alteration in 
the basic tissue requirements for oxygen. And 
that's basically what the blood does, it takes 
oxygen and foodstuff to the brain for it to 
survive on. But various other factors are in-
volved, and they are all altered by stress. Our 
bodies are such that this is a fact of life. And 
there is little question that individuals subject-
ed to harrassment, stress, who are ill because 
of pre-existing strokes, heart attacks, what 
have you, or just arteriosclerosis anywhere 
will be made worse by this type of activity. 
However, in arriving at even this limited opin-
ion, the doctor was unaware that the only court hear-
ing Judge Elton had had in the Clark Ronnow case 
lasted from fifteen minutes to a maximum of an hour 
(R. 385) and that the total court time he spent on the 
Sunday Closing Law was a total of ten hours over a 
period of three separate days ( R. 385) . He further 
admitted that all persons are subject to such stress in 
the ordinary affairs of life (R. 386), worry about 
their family, and in Judge Elton's case stress brought 
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about by the fact that he had been having strokes (R. 
387). He further admitted that the stress arises not 
so much out of the nature of the work being perform-
ed as the personality of the individual called type A 
personality traits and type B personality traits (R. 
394) : 
. . . Type A being very agressive, hard 
working, striving to meet the deadline type of 
individual, and whom you can demonstrate 
without any question they have a very marked 
affinity for vascular disease. Type B being an 
individual who is more sedentary, who is less 
agressive, and they exclude things like you 
can't - people admitted to this study, they 
don't have diabetes, they don't have high blood 
pressure, the only factors different are life 
styles, and everything else being about the 
same, as close as can be determined. . . . ( R. 
394, 395). 
Dr. Chester Powell, a physician specializing in 
neurologic surgery including injuries to the brain 
brought about by some kind of a vascular condition 
(R. 463 and 464) gave his opinion as to the cause of 
Leonard Elton's death on May 13th as follows: 
The evidence of Dr Dalrymple's observa-
tions, treating the patient, the hospital records 
and the autopsy report would indicate that 
Judge Elton suffered from a progressive dis-
order of the blood vessels called athrosclerosis 
or arteriosclerosis; more simply hardening of 
the arteries. This involved the arteries not only 
of the heart, but the arteries of the brain. The 
heart showed evidence of past disease, past 
heart attacks and complications in the anat-
omy of the heart as a result. The blood vessels 
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of the brain showed hardening with thickening 
of their walls, so as to decrease the opening or 
the channel through which the blood passed, 
and produced a complete obstruction on the 
right side resulting in an area - a large area 
of the brain failing to receive its blood supply. 
This area is called in medical terms an infarct. 
The tissue of the brain having lost its blood 
supply actually dies. The extent of this dam-
age to the brain was such that it led to Judge 
Elton's death. ( R. 465, 466). 
As to whether or not there was anything unus-
ual about Judge Elton's death on May 13, 1970, he 
testified: 
... This was a chronic disease which slow-
ly progresses, producing various complications 
and problems incident to its effect on the blood 
supply in areas of the body where the arteries 
are involved. This con di ti on tends to progress, 
and patients die in time unless some intercur-
rent illness or accident occurs from one of the 
common complications of the disease as it ef-
fects either the heart, the brain or the kidney, 
or some other vital organ. The evidence in the 
autopsy and in - otherwise concerning Judge 
Elton's health would indicate this was a chron-
ic disorder which was in process for a period of 
at least years, with this ultimate outcome to be 
expected. 
I don't think there was anything unusual 
or out of the ordinary at all that he expired of 
brain complications of the disease. Perhaps the 
only unusual thing is with an aneurysm of that 
size in his heart, that this hadn't ruptured and 
caused his death before he died of the cerebral 
complications. (R. 467, 468). 
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In response to a hyp<Jthetical question asked of 
Dr. Powell in regard to whether or not the work load 
and the other stress which Judge Elton was under at 
the time of his death caused his death, Dr. Powell tes-
tified: 
I don't think this could be considered, 
from what we know of the disease and how it 
- how the disease produced Judge Elton's 
death, a factor in the immediate occurrence of 
his death. I don't think that the tension or work 
load could be considered a proximate cause of 
death. We know only that stress and tension 
have some general effect on the occurrence of 
arteriosclerosis. It is a medical hypothesis or 
theory. There is no reliable medical scientific 
evidence confirming this. And if it does have 
an effect, it is a chronic effect exerted over a 
period of years. 
Had Judge Elton died of a cerebral hem-
orrhage which could have been attributed to a 
marked rise in blood pressure, then I think we 
could have said that immediate tensions, work 
loads, stress, could conceivably have played a 
significant role in the death occurring under 
those circumstances. In this situation, I don't 
think that stress or strain had any immediate 
or specific effect on the outcome and course of 
the disease. 
Although Dr. Chester Powell did not treat Leon-
ard Elton, he did have occasion to see him on a few 
occasions prior to his death. In response to questions 
by the plaintiff's attorney, he testified as follows: 
A. I recollect seeing him on two or three occa-
sions in this court building, and once or 
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twice on the street. I did not examine him 
on any of those occasions. 
Q. Well, you wouldn't purport to give any di-
agnosis of what was wrong with him from 
those observations? 
A. No, except that it was apparent that he was 
probably a chronically ill gentleman, and 
tha:t changes were occurring. What they 
were, I couldn't have said simply from 
these observations. 
Q. When you say chronically ill, ill of what? 
A. I could see that he had lost weight, that 
there was a change in his posture and gait, 
and I wondered if he might not have some 
chronic disorder. For one thing, the char-
acteristic of his gait suggested to me that 
he might have cerebral vascular disease. 
Q. Now did I understand you to say that in 
answer to counsel's question that you could 
expect Judge Elton's death on May 13th at 
9 :30 in the morning? 
A. I think we would have anticipated that 
death was imminent, and would have oc-
curred from complications of his vascular 
disease, not that it would occur at any spe-
cific time or date; that it did occur at that 
time I think was consistent with what we 
know of his physical con di ti on. ( R. 4 73, 
474). 
From the question of what role stress may have 
played in Leonard Elton's death, the doctor testified 
i.n response to questions by plaintiff's attorney: 
A. My opinion would be that stress sustained 
over a period of years, according to present 
medical evidence, probably played some 
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role, how much or how little, it would be 
impossible to say, in the development of 
his arteriosclerosis; generally probably 
played a rather specific role in the occur-
rence of the heart attack. But I don't think 
it would play any role in the occurence of 
the infarct. 
Q. No matter how serious that stress was, or 
how unusual? 
A. Not an immediate and direct cause and ef-
fect role. Over years, it might have had 
some - played some role in the develop-
ment of the arterosclerosis. (R. 476, 477). 
POINT I. 
THE POLICY IN THE PRESENT CASE CLEAR-
LY REQUIRES THAT THE INSURED MUST 
DIE AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENTAL 
BODILY INJURY. 
The policy involved in the present case states 
that: 
The Company certifies that the Employee 
to whom this certificate is issued ... is insured 
under the above group policy against injury 
sustained by the Insured Person ... 
·'Injury' wherever used in this certificate 
means bodily injury occurring while the Group 
Policy is in force as to the Insured Person ... 
whose injury is the basis of claim and causing 
the loss directly and independently of all other 
causes and effected solely through an accident-
al bodily injury to the Insured Person . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
The policy in the present case clearly contains 
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the word "accidental," which is sufficient to require 
proof that the insured died an accidental death. Any 
construction to the contrary is clearly erroneous since 
it is in direct contravention of past decisions of this 
Court and sound rules of construction. 
The past decisions of this Court clearly indicate 
that the word "accidental" in the insuring clause is 
sufficient to establish that an insurance policy only 
covers injuries caused by accident. In Richards v. 
Standard Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 
200 P. 1017 ( 1921), relied on by plaintiff in her trial 
memorandum, the Court considered a policy which 
insured against 
( L) oss resulting from bodily injuries ef-
fected directly, exclusively and independently 
of all other causes, through accidental means 
... Id. at 1018. 
The Court held that the beneficiary of the insur-
ance policy could recover where the insured, a mining 
engineer, died from sunstroke in the desert while re-
turning from a trip on foot to a mining prospect, 
which was represented to him as being only six in-
stead of ten miles distant; such misrepresentation or 
miscalculation of distance being an accidental, unex-
pected, or unseen event. In doing so the court held 
that the plaintiff must prove that the death was acci-
idental. The court relied on the words "accidental 
means" since there was apparently no disease exclu-
sion in the policy. The court said: 
If the sunstroke in the present case was 
not, in and of itself, an accidental means, as we 
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think it was, it, nevertheless, according to the 
undisputed evidence, resulted from accidental 
means or an accidental cause. An 'accidental 
means' is a means or a cause that is unexpect-
ed, unforeseen, and fortuitous; it is an acci-
dental event, unexpected and unforseeable, an 
occurrence that is unexpected and unforeseen. 
The authorities generally hold that death 
or injury does not result from accident or ac-
cidental means within the terms of an accident 
insurance policy where the injury or death is 
the natural and probable result of the insured's 
voluntary act unaccompanied by anything un-
foreseen except the dea:th or injury. The auth-
orities cited by appellant in support of this 
proposition may be found in 7 A.L. R. 1131, 
1132, and I.C.J. 427-429. However, it is a well-
established exception to the above rule that 
where death or injury is not the natural and 
probable result of a voluntary and intentional 
act by the insured, or something unforeseen or 
unexpected or unusual occurs in the act which 
precedes the injury, then the injury is the re-
sult of accidental means. Supporting this prop-
osition numerous authorities are cited by the 
annotator in 7 A.L.R. 1132, 1133. The leading 
case on the subject is that of United States v. 
Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 
60, in which it is held: 
"The term 'accidental' was used in the 
policy in its ordinary popular sense, as mean-
ing, 'happening by chance; unexpectedly tak-
ing place; not according to the usual course of 
things; or not as expected'; that, if a result is 
such as fallows from ordinary means, volun-
tarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpect-
ed way, it cannot be called a result effected by 
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accidental means; but that if, in the act which 
precedes the injury, something- unforeseen, un-
expected, unusual occurs which produces the 
injury, then the injury has resulted through 
accidental means." 
In Western Commercial Travelers' As-
s'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 29 C.C.A. 223, 40 
L.R.A. 653, Judge Sanborn gives a clear defin-
ition of 'accidental means' as follows: 
"'The significance of this word ''accident-
al' is best perceived by a consideration of the 
relation of causes to their effects. The word 
is descriptive of means which produce effects 
which are not their natural and probable con-
sequences. The na:tural consequence of means 
used in the consequence which ordinarily fol-
lows from their use - the result which may be 
reasonably anticipated from their use, and 
which ought to be expected. The probable con-
sequence of the use of given means is the conse-
quence which is more likely to follow from 
their use than it is to fail to follow. An effect 
which is the natural and probable consequence 
of an act or course of action is not an accident, 
nor is it produced by accidental means. It is 
either the result of actual design, or it falls un-
der the maxim that every man must be held to 
intend the na:tural and probable consequence 
of his deeds. On the other hand, an effect which 
is not the natural or probable consequence of 
the means which produced it, an effect which 
does not ordinarily follow and cannot be rea-
sonably anticipated from the use of these 
means, an effect which the actor did not intend 
to produce, and which he cannot be charged 
with the design of producing under the maxim 
to which we have adverted, is produced by ac-
cidental means. It is produced by means which 
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were neither designed nor calculated to cause 
it. Such an effect is not the result of design, 
cannot ?e reasonably anticipated, is unexpect-
ed, and is produced by an unusual combination 
of fortuitous circumstances; in other words 
it is produced by accidental means." Id. at 
1022, 1023. 
In Thompson v. American Casualty Company, 
20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276 (1968) the Court again 
required a showing of accidental death when the only 
policy language relied on was the simple phrase "ac-
cidental means." Id. at 419. 
Since this Court has repeatedly held that the 
phrase "accidental means" is sufficient to require the 
plaintiff to show that the insured's death was '''acci-
dental," it is important to dispel the notion that this 
phrase has any greater significance than the phrases 
"accidental bodily injury" or '''accidental result." 
This was done over 25 years ago by Justice Wolfe in 
Handley v. Mutiwl Life Insurance Company of New 
York, 106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319, 152 A.L.R. 1278 
(1944), in which the insured had been operated on 
for a hernia. The operation was an apparent success 
but the patient died three weeks later of a pulmonary 
embolism caused by a blood clot which had formed 
behind the site of the operation. The beneficiary sued 
for recovery on the theory that the formation of this 
clot was an unusual, unforeseen and unexpected re-
sult of such an operation since proper operating pro-
cedures had been followed and no apparent mishaps 
had occurred during the operation. The policy requir-
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ed that the insured die from "accidental means." In 
affirming the verdict for plaintiff, the Court inter-
preted the phrase "accidental means" and rejected 
the defendant's contention that this language requir-
ed the cause of the injury (i.e. the operation) to be 
unexpected or unforeseen. Justice Wolfe said : 
. . . This court has definitely gone on re-
cord as construing the provision under discus-
sion and equivalent provisions as reaching 
cases where the death or disablement is the 
unexpected result, intended acts making the 
result itself, rather than the means, the acci-
dent. Id at 191, 14 7 P.2d 322. 
The net result of these two cases is to require the 
plaintiff to prove that the injury or death of the in-
sured was accidental in that it was brought about by 
an unexpected event or is not the natural and prob-
able consequence of the means which produced it, an 
effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be 
reasonably anticipated from the event. 
It is clear that, for 25 years, Utah law has made 
no distinction between the phrases "bodily injury ef-
fected solely through ... accidental means" and "bod-
ily injury effected solely through an ... accidental 
event." Under Utah decisions these phrases clearly 
had the same legal effect. In the present case the pol-
icy states that the insured must die from "an acci-
dental bodily injury." This is synonymous with the 
phrase "accidental event" since a bodily injury is ob-
viously an "event." Therefore, the three phrases men-
tioned in the above paragraph clearly have the same 
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legal significance and clearly require the beneficiary 
to prove that the decedent died from an "accident." 
For 25 years there has been no ambiquity about 
the meaning of the word '''accident" in Utah law. 
There was no ambiquity about its meaning when this 
policy was written and sold to Utah State employees. 
The law interpeting the policy language used in this 
policy should not be changed after the parties have 
relied on that law in drafting the policy. 
The plaintiff also contends that the word '''acci-
dent" must be construed strictly against the insurer. 
However, in Handley, supra, this Court stated that 
an insurance contract should only be construed 
against the insurer when it contains ambiguities. Id. 
at 1282. In light of the extensive Utah law defining 
the word "accident," it was not ambiguous when it 
was inserted in the policy involved in the present case. 
In the present case the insurer obviously intend-
ed to restrict recovery to situations where the dece-
dent died from '''accidental" dea:th. The Court should 
not change the contract after it has been written. 
Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section 15 :37 says: 
It is the duty of the courts in interpreting 
insurance contracts to enforce and carry out 
the contract which the parties have made, 
without importing anything into the contract 
by construction contrary to its express terms, 
or the plain meaning of its terms, or attempt-
ing to make a better or different contract .... 
Plaintiff relies heavily on the differences in the 
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language between the insurance contract in the pre-
sent case and the '''classical accident policy." There 
are several clauses sometimes found in accident poli-
cies which were absent from Judge Elton's policy. 
There was no requirement that the cause of injury 
be "external and violent;" also, there was no exclu-
sion specifically barring recovery from deaths con-
tributed to partially by disease. Plaintiff than argues 
that, because the policy lacks these clauses, the clause 
requiring that the injury be accidental is somehow 
rendered ineffective. The fallacy of this argument is 
obvious. 'These clauses are separable, and the absence 
of one clause does not weaken the effect of the others. 
The requirement of "accidental bodily injury" is in 
the policy and cannot be eliminated by strictissimi 
juris or any other doctrine the plaintiff may rely on. 
The presence of the accidental bodily injury require-
ment in the policy is even more compelling in light of 
the fact that so many of the other elements of the 
classical accident policy were omitted. 
In interpreting the contract in the present case, 
plaintiff relies heavily on the absence of a clause spe-
cifically excluding disease. Because of the absence of 
this clause, the plaintiff claims that: 
Since the policy in the case at bar contain-
ed no exclusion concerning the type of injury 
that plaintiff died from, the law is clear that 
it is no defense to claim that tqe death would 
have occurred ultimately, even without the ac-
cident or to claim that it was a disease or dis-
30 
ability which ultimately caused the death. (R. 
128). 
This over-states the effect of the absence of the 
specific disease exclusion. Two different interpreta-
tions have been made on the effect of this language. 
First, absent such an exclusion, the courts have held 
that recovery may be denied under this language if 
an insured died from a disease which was so chronic 
and progressive that it could be expected to be a 
source of mischief. In McMartin v. Fidelity & Cas-
ualty Co. of New York, 264 N.Y. 220, 190 N.E. 415 
(1934) the decedent was insured "against disability 
or death resulting directly and independently of all 
other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through 
external, violent and accidental means." 'The insured 
had suffered from chronic and progressive nephritis 
(an inflammation of the kidneys) when he was in-
volved in an automobile accident which caused rib 
damage. Although the pain subsided after five or six 
days, the insured died of nephritis twenty days after 
the accident. Id. 415. In affirming the judgment for 
defendant by the trial court, the appellate court con-
strued the policy and said : 
[I] t is appropriate to paraphrase as fol-
lows a recent statement of the rule by Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo: Under a policy phrased as this 
one, the 1nsurer may be relieved of liability if 
an idiosyncratic condition of mind or body pre-
disposing the insured to injury is so acute as to 
constitute a disease .... (Justice Cardozo said 
in his dissenting opinion in a prior case that) 
The disease or the infirmity must be so consid-
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erable or significant that it would be charac-
terized as disease or infirmity in the common 
speech of men ... of such quality or degree 
that in its natural and probable development 
it may be expected to be a source of mischief. 
Id. at 415. 
In applying the language of that policy to the 
facts of that particular case, the court said: 
Nephritis existent for at least three years, 
chronic and progressive, may not with any fit-
ness of language or with any sense of reality 
be described as a mere predisposing tendency. 
It is a condition which in its natural and prob-
able development may be expected to ·be a 
source of mischief, and so a disease; and if it 
were mentioned as inflammation of the kid-
neys instead as of nephritis, the ordinary man 
in his common speech would unquestionably 
call it a disease. Id. at 416. 
The nub of defendant's contention on this point 
is that, although the policy in the present case lacks 
a specific disease exclusion it still requires that the 
death be accidental. Therefore, the plaintiff may not 
recover under a policy containing this language when 
the disease is the primary cause of death. 
Second, even if the interpretation pressed by the 
plaintiff is accepted, the accident is still required to 
be the primary cause of death before recovery can be 
granted under an accident policy which lacks a di-
sease exclusion. In Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section 
41 :380 it says: 
There is a distinction between an accident 
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policy covering loss ''resulting directly, inde-
pendently and exclusively" from other causes 
and a similar policy containing the additional 
phrase excluding disabiilty "wholly or in part, 
directly or indirectly, from disease or other 
bodily infirmities," or phrases of like nature. 
The phrase "resulting directly, independently 
and exclusively" refers to the efficient, sub-
stantial, and proximate cause of the disability 
at the time it occurs. On the other hand, a pol-
icy containing the additional phrase set out 
above refers to another contributory cause, 
whether proximate or remote. Where, under a 
policy containing only the first phrase, the ac-
cidental injury acts upon a pre-existing di-
sease causing total disability which except for 
such disease would not have occurred, the in-
jury is deemed to be the proximate cause of the 
disability entitling recovery. But it is other-
wise where the policy contains the additional 
phrase indicated above. Of course, the result 
would be otherwise in this latter situation 
where the disease resulted from the accidental 
injury or if the accidental injury caused the 
disablement independently of the disease. Oth-
erwise stated, where the policy covers acci-
dental death resulting directly and indepen-
denUy of all other causes through external, 
violent, and accidental means, liability arise.;; 
if the accident is the movinq, sole, and proxi-
mate cause of death, even though a pre-exist-
ing disease or physical infirmity is a necessary 
condition to the result. However, where the in-
surer's liability is further restricted by a 
clause avoiding liabiilty where death results 
directly or indirectly from disease or from bod-
ily or mental infirmity, it is not sufficient to 
create liability to establish a direct casual rela-
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tion between the accident and the death or dis-
ability, but the plaintiff must show that the 
resulting condition was caused solely by exter-
nal and accidental means, if the evidence points 
to a pre-existing infirmity or abnormality 
which may have been a contributing factor, the 
burden is upon him to produce further evi-
dence to exclude this possibility. (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, it is clear that the authorities require 
that the plaintiff, as a prerequisite to recovery under 
the policy language in this case, must prove that Leon-
ard Elton died as a result of an accidental bodily 
injury in the sense that the event which produced the 
injury was in itself unforeseen and unexpected or, 
if not, the results of the event must be the unnatural 
or improbable consequence of the means which pro-
duced it, an effect which does not ordinarily flow and 
cannot be reasonably anticipated from the means or 
event. The plaintiff overstates the law when she 
claims that'' ... it is no defense to claim that the death 
would have occurred ultimately, even without the ac-
cident or to claim that it was a disease or disability 
which ultimately caused the death." (R. 128). This 
is misleading because under either policy it must be 
proven that the accident is the moving, sole, and prox-
imate cause of death, even though a pre-existing di-
sease or physical infirmity is a necessary condition to 
that result. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE ELTON'S 
DEATH WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL AND BE-
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CA USE IT WAS FORESEEABLE AND NOT 
UNEXPECTED. 
As has been seen from the authorities cited un-
der Point I, the plaintiff has the burden of proving in 
this case that Leonard Elton died as a result of an ac-
cidental bodily injury. This burden could have been 
met by proving that an unexpected event occurred 
which produced the injury. However, if the event it-
self is not unexpected, the plaintiff would be required 
to prove that the injury was the unexpected result 
of the intended act. In this case the plaintiff relies 
upon the evidence that Judge Elton was acting as 
Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District and 
was handling the case of a public official charged 
with the misuse of funds and a question involving the 
constitutionality of the Sunday Closing Law. 
There is no element of chance, unexpectedness 
or accident about a judge voluntarily undertaking to 
act as Presiding Judge or to try cases involving con-
stitutional issues or public officials. If we assume, 
for the purpose of argument, that the stress and 
strain Leonard Elton was under at the time of his 
death had something to do with contributing to the 
cause of his death, the evidence failed to meet the bur-
den of proof because it failed to show that his death or 
injury was not the natural and probable result of a 
voluntary and intentional act of Judge Elton. 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance 
Company, supra, the court allowed recovery on two 
grounds: First, that the trip was 8 miles longer than 
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the insured had anticipated and, second, that the sun-
stroke was an unusual event in an arid climate. This 
is the first case in which the court stated that death 
or injury from a voluntary act can be an accident. 
The court stated clearly that a death or injury was 
"accidental" when it was the unforeseen and unex-
pected result of an act, regardless of whether the act 
was accidental or voluntarily committed by the in-
sured. 
This test for accident has subsequently been ap-
plied by this court on numerous occasions. In What-
cott v. Continental Casualty Company, 85 Utah 406, 
39 P.2d 733 ( 1935) the insured was protected 
against "loss of life ... resulting from a personal bod-
ily injury which is effected solely and independently 
of all other causes by happening of an external, vio-
lent and purely accidental event." Id. at 734. Novo-
cain was injected into the insured's spine as an anes-
thetic during a routine appendectomy. Unknown to 
the insured or his doctors, he suffered from a hyper-
susceptibili ty to novocain and died on the operating 
table when his body's reaction to the drug caused 
respiratory failure. The court reversed the verdict 
for the defendant in the trial court and remanded for 
new trial. The trial court held that this could be an 
accidental death because the involuntary acts of sub-
mitting to the incision or the anesthetic resulted in 
an unexpected and unforeseen result, the insured's 
death. 
The rule is again applied in Handley v. Mutvnl 
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Life Imurance Company of New York, 106Utah184, 
147 P.2d 319 ( 1944), in which the insured had a life 
insurance policy which had a provision which provid-
ed double indemnity if "the insured died as a direct re-
sult of bodily injury effected solely through external, 
violent and accidental means, independently and ex-
clusively of all other causes ... " Id. at 187, 14 P.2d 
at 320. The insured suffered a hernia when a steel 
bar hit him in the groin. The routine operation was 
subsequently performed to repair the hernia and 
there was no deviation from standard operating pro-
cedures. Nineteen days after the operation the in-
sured died from a pulmonary embolism caused by a 
blood clot which had formed behind the operation site. 
The formation of this clot was an unusual occurrence. 
The court affirmed the trial court's decision for the 
plaintiff. 
In Kellogg v. California Western States Life In-
surance Company, 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949 
( 194 9) the insured was covered under a policy which 
protected against "bodily injury ... which is effected 
exclusively and wholly by external, violent and acci-
dental means, of which there is a visible contusion or 
wound on the body ... " Id. at 950. This was the 
double indemnity clause of a life insurance policy. 
There was also a specific clause excluding death re-
sulting "directly or indirectly, from ... physical or 
mental infirmity ... illness or disease of any kind ... '' 
Id. at 950. The insured had been operated on in 1944 
for a perforated duodenal ulcer and, immediately af-
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ter the operation, he suffered shock and was in criti-
cal condition. He recevored, and in 1945 underwent an 
·operation for ventral hernia which apparently devel-
oped from the first operations. He was an extremely 
muscular man and in making the incision the surgeon 
discovered 17 adhesions which greatly prolonged the 
time required to perform the operation. The opera-
tion took six hours and the insured suffered from loss 
of blood and body fluid, but there were no unusual 
occurrences. Within eight hours after the second op-
eration the insured was in post-operative shock and 
he died the next day. The court affirmed the trial 
court's finding that the death was not accidental. It 
said that the post-operative shock and ensuing death 
were foreseeable in light of the insured's history of 
post-operative shock one year before and the 1 7 adhe-
sions which the surgeon found after he anesthetized 
the patient and started the second operation. 
Therefore, in the Handley and Whatcott cases 
this court held the death to be accidental when there 
was no prior medical history which would indicate 
that the insured might suffer injury resulting in 
death from his voluntary act in submitted to the op-
eration. However, this court has refused to hold that 
a death was accidental when the insured\~ prior med-
ical history and the medical discoveries made by the 
surgeon at the time of the operation indicated that 
the type of injury that the insured suffered from was 
not unexpected. 
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Under this test, Leonard Elton's death on May 
13, 1970, was clearly not an "accident" in light of Dr. 
Powell's statement that he looked like a man with 
cerebral vascular insufficiency several weeks before 
his death, Mr. Harold Waldo's statement that Judge 
Elton looked very tired on the afternoon of May 6th 
and Dr. Dalrymple's statements that Judge Elton 
suffered from a stroke on April 21st (R. 325), acer-
ebral vascular incident on April 28th (R. 326) and 
loss of memory on May 5th (R. 302, 303). Also, Dr. 
Dalrymple stated that he increased Judge Elton's 
medication on April 28th because '~I knew he was in 
trouble" ( R. 326), and the doctor suggested on April 
21st that the Judge go into the hospital (R. 325). In 
light of this extensive history of cerebral vascular 
trouble in the weeks before his death, the fatal stroke 
on May 13, 1970, was not unexpected and, therefore, 
not an accident. 
Taking the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, 
Dr. Clyde Null, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and it must be remembered that he did not 
testify that the stress which Leonard Elton was un-
der at the time of his death caused his death but sim-
ply that it may have markedly aggravated his basic 
disease, the purport of his testimony seems to be that 
persons who are placed under chronic stress, or, that 
is, stress for a long period of time, have an increased 
risk of having strokes and heart attacks, simply 
from the fact that stress aggravates arteriosclerosis. 
This is simply to say that the natural and probable re-
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sult of the stress which Leonard Elton may have been 
under at the time of his death is that it would aggra~ 
vate his basic disease of arteriosclerosis; or in other 
words, the natural and probable result of a man with 
the basic condition of Leonard Elton subjecting him-
self to stress is that it will aggravate his basic condi-
tion. To put it in a common vernacular, if a person as 
sick as Leonard Elton was voluntarily subjects him-
self to a heavy work load, the natural, probable and 
foreseeable result is that his condition would be worse 
than if the stayed home and rested and that he might 
die from that condition sooner than if he had elected 
to stay away from work. This presumes, of course, 
that Judge Elton was under a great deal of stress at 
the time of his death, which is not borne out by the 
record, since the evidence shows that Judge Elton 
was taking considerable time off from work immedi-
ately prior to his death on May 13, 1970. Moreover, 
from the time actually spent in court, the cases which 
Judge Elton was handling at the time of his death do 
not appear to have been of the magnitude claimed by 
the plaintiff. Therefore, it is seen that there was noth-
ing accidental about Judge Elton's death because 
there was neither an accidental event which caused 
his death nor an unforeseen or unexpected result 
from an act which Leonard Elton voluntarily under-
took prior to his death. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF JUDGE ELTON'S DEATH WAS "AC-
CIDENTAL," RECOVERY MUST BE DENIED 
BECAUSE DISEASE, NOT ACCIDENT, WAS 
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THE PREDOMINANT CAUSE OF HIS DEATH 
In Tomaiiwli v. United States Fidelity And 
Guaranty Company, 75 N.J. Super. 192, 182 A.2d 
582, the insured was covered under apolicy protecting 
against "loss resulting directly and independently of 
all other causes from accidental bodily injuries .... " 
Id. at 584. The policy also contained a clause provid-
ing that: 
This policy does not cover any accident or 
loss caused or contributed to by ... 
( 3) disease, or medical or surgical treat-
ment therefor, or bacterial infections (except 
pus-forming infections occurring through an 
accidental cut or wound) ... Id. at 584. 
The decedent was involved in a minor automo-
bile accident in which no one was injured, but he be-
came extremely emotionally ups~t, slipped and fell 
and died of a heart attack. The plaintiff sued on the 
theory that the automobile accident caused the heart 
attack and, therefore, the insured died from acci-
dental bodily injuries. In affirming the trial 
court's decision for the defendant, the court 
relied on the language requiring that the death 
occur "directly and independently of all other 
causes." Id. at 588. The court reviewed the New Jer-
sey decisions on this question and concluded that the 
insured could not recover when an accident combined 
with an active, progressive disease and caused the 
insured's death; however, the insured could recover 
if the accident triggered a latent inactive disease and 
thereby caused the insured's death. 
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The court answered the plaintiff's contention 
that this construction made the policy meaningless by 
stating: 
... Oommon sense dictates that no reason-
able person at age 72 suffering from arterio-
sclerotic heart disease complicated by an aneu-
rysm and diabetes would expect to be found in-
surable for life insurance purposes, and that 
if under any circumstances he was able to ob-
tain for $31 a year an insurance policy which 
contained a death benefit of $10,000, he would 
know that the benefit would be limited to a cov-
erage area of extremely small compass .... 
Yet, the scope of coverage here was not so 
limited that a court should say that decedent 
received little or nothing for his money. There 
are many situations which would have requir-
ed payment of the benefit by the company not 
withstanding the insured's physical infirmi-
ties; for example, a suddenly fatal airplane, 
highway, rail, steamship, or household acci-
dent, in which other persons lost their lives or 
were severely injured, or an accident not im-
mediately fatal but involving the inflicting of 
bodily injuries on the assured from which he 
would probably have died, even if prior there-
to he had been in a perfect state of health. It 
was with a view to such occurrences, or the 
like, that the pa:rties bargained." Id. at 590 
(Emphasis in original) 
In Herthel v. Time Insurance Company, 221 
Wis. 208, 265 N.W. 575 (1936), in which the court 
described the insurance policy by saying: 
The coverage clause of the policy in suit 
was somewhat broader than those commonly 
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involved in the adjudicated cases, and insured 
against loss from death resulting from ''per-
sonal bodily injury ... effected directly and 
independently of all other causes through ac-
cidental means, . . ." The phrases "through 
external violence" and "directly or indirectly" 
commonly used in accident policies, do not oc-
cur in the clause. Id. at 576. 
The insured died from a heart attack which oc-
curred while he was pulling a boat up onto the beach. 
In reversing the trial Court's verdict for the plaintiff 
and ordering the complaint dismissed, the court said: 
... From the great majority of those cases 
and upon reason, the general rule seems fairly 
deducible that, if a disease or bodily condi-
tion exists and an accident occurs, to constitute 
the accidental means the sole cause of an in-
jury, under policies like the one in suit, it is not 
necessary that the injury or the results thereof 
would have been as severe as they were had the 
disease or bodily condition not existed; but it 
is sufficient ilf the accidental means would 
have solely caused some considerable injury 
had the disease or bodily condition not existed. 
But, if no considerable injury at all would have 
resulted had the insured not been afflicted 
with the existing disease or condition, the ac-
cidental means cannot be considered as the sole 
cause of the injury. Id. at 577-78 
This rule was also followed in Alessandro v. Mas-
sachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 630 
( 1965) , in which a policy provided benefits for total 
disability caused by ''accidental bodily injury." Id. 
at 631. The policy also included benefits for sickness 
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to which the insured was not entitled. The insured 
had a history of degenerative disease of his spinal 
discs and injured his back while leaning forward to 
work on an air con di ti oner. In affirming the trial 
court's verdict for the insurer, the court said: 
If rw considerable injury at all would have 
resulted had the appellant not been afflicted 
with the existing disease or con di ti on, then the 
accident cou?d not be considered the proximate 
cause of the harm, but rather the disease must 
be so considered. Id. at 633. (Emphasis added) 
This Court should take careful note of the fact 
that this recent California decision was reached un-
der policy language identical to Judge Elton's policy, 
neither policy contained a disease exclusion or an "ex-
ternal and violent" requirement. The only policy lan-
guage which the court relied on in Alessandro was the 
phrase "accidental bodily injury." Under that langu-
age alone, the court reached the very logical conclu-
sion that the accident itself must be capable of caus-
ing some harm before recovery will be allowed under 
an accident policy. 
In Murasky v. Commercial Travelers M11t1wl 
Acc. Ass'n. of America, 94 F.2d 578 ( 1938), the court 
said: 
An inference or mere scintilla was not 
enough to warrant the court below in the sub-
mission of the issue to the jury as to whether 
he had a fall due solely to an accidental cause. 
(Citations omitted) The rule ~a~ long_ been 
established that where pre-existing disease 
causes or contributes in causing death, there 
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can be no recovery and under such circum-
stances there is no issue for the jury. Id. 579-
80. 
This rule is not inconsistent with the Utah law 
on this question. The distinction between latent and 
active disease is recognized in Lee v. New York Life 
Insiirance Company, 95 Utah 445, 82 P.2d 178 
(1938), in which the life insurance policy provided 
double indemnity if death resulted "directly and in-
dependently of all other causes from bodily injury 
effected solely through external, violent and accident-
al causes ... " Id. at 446, 82 P.2d at 178. It also con-
tained a clause excluding injury caused by disease. 
The insured had a disease of the gall bladder which 
was dormant until the tongue of a loaded trailer 
struck him in the stomach, rupturing the gall bladder. 
The infection released :from the ruptured gall bladder 
caused his death, and the court held that the sole cause 
of his death was the accident because the disease had 
been dormant and was activated by the accident. 
This distinction was also recognized in Tucker 
v. New York Life Insurance Company, 107 Utah 478, 
155 P.2d 173 ( 1945) which involved a policy identi-
cal to the one in Lee, supra. The insured had had high 
blood pressure for one year before the accident. He fell 
and broke his arm, aggravating his hypertension and 
causing a weakened artery to burst. The court refus-
ed to allow double indemnity, saying that the disease 
was active and worked with the accident to cause 
death and that, therefore, the accident was not the sole 
cause of death. 
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All of the doctors who testified in this case 
agreed that Judge Leonard Elton suffered a stroke 
or died as a result of a cerebral thrombosis which 
cut off the supply of blood to a vital area of his brain 
and caused swelling shutting down the vital functions 
of his body (R. 465, 329, 375, 431). All agreed that 
the cerebral thrombosis or the clotting of the vessel 
in Judge Elton's brain was in turn caused by the di-
sease of arteriosclerosis (R. 375, 384, 342, 432, 465). 
There was no dispute that this disease had progressed 
to the point that, 16 years prior to his death, it had 
caused a heart attack when an infarct occurred in one 
of the vessels leading to the heart muscle. The 1 
autopsy also revealed that, prior to his death, infarcts 
had occurred in the spleen and kidney as well as the 
brain. The progression of the disease is evidenced by 
the increased number of episodes, starting with the 
stroke experienced by Judge Elton in 1969 shortly be-
fore his death. Dr. Dalrymple recognized this as is 
apparent from his testimony to the effect that from 
the first time he saw Judge Elton in January of 1969 
until the time he died, he never released the Judge 
from his care. He was in the language of Dr. Dal-
rymple a sick man (R. 331). The doctor was afraid , 
because of Judge Elton's inherent personality that he 
might have another stroke and was treating him with 
the hoDe that he could prevent one (R. 355). He re-
cognized that the factors which had caused the heart 
attack prior to 1954, the inf arc ts in the spleen and 1 
kidneys prior to 1969, and the stroke of 1969 were 
still present in Judge Elton's body and that he was 
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likely to have another stroke in the future (R. 355). 
The progression of the disease was also evident to lay 
witnesses who observed the Judge from the time of 
his stroke until the time of his death in 1970. The fact 
that, from mid-April, 1970, he was tired (R. 207, 
227, 239, 254, 261, 269, 276, 289), ashen in ap-
pearance and that his mind often wandered; that he 
had dizzy spells ( R. 299, 300) and periods when he 
lost his memory (R. 302) evidenced the mental and 
physical deterioration which was taking place by rea-
son of an inadequate blood supply (R. 346). All of the 
doctors agreed that a condition of arteriosclerosis is 
brought about by a metabolic defect which causes ma-
terials to be deposited upon the walls of the arteries 
and that this is an inherited condition. (R. 429, 466, 
324). All agree that given this condition, diet, lack of 
exercise and smoking may be factors which affect but 
do not cause the condition. (R. 335, 336, 430, 466). 
There was a conflict of testimony as to whether the 
type of stress which Leonard Elton was under at the 
time of his death may be a factor which affects the 
condition. Dr. Shelley Swift and Dr. Powell both testi-
fied that the type of stress which it is claimed Judge 
Elton had at the time of his death would not and could 
not cause arteriosclerosis and that the only type of 
stress which could have brought about the death of 
Leonard Elton would be that type of stress which 
would produce psycho logic stress producing shock, like 
loss of blood, burns, physical trauma or sharp rise in 
blood pressure which produce a pathologic stress re-
action. All doctors agreed that if stress is to have any-
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thing to do with the cause of the basic condition, it 
must exist over a period of time. Dr. Clyde Null des-
crib this as chronic stress. Dr. Powell said stress sus-
tained over a period of years probably play some role. 
If we are to accept the testimony of Dr. Null, the stress 
which it is claimed markedly aggravated the condition 
of arteriosclerosis which Leonard Elton had was not 
due to any accident or the nature of the work which 
he was performing but by reason of inherent per-
sonality of Leonard Elton, he being what Dr. Null 
described as a "type A individual," an aggressive, 
hard working, striving individual. In other words, 
stress over a period of years might have and probably 
would have more effect on Leonard Elton than other 
individuals, but this is just another way of saying that 
Leonard Elton inherited a defect or, if you prefer, 
an emotional defect which made him particularly 
susceptible to the disease of arteriosclerosis. It 
should be noted that the strokes or episodes which pre-
ceded Judge Elton's death occurred not during times 
of emotional excitement but rather when he was rest-
ing or had been resting, which would be the time in 
which his blood was traveling at the lowest rate and 
clogging most likely to occur. Even if we accept the 
plaintiff's thesis that the particular stress which 
Judge Leonard Elton was under in the months preced-
ing his death had something to do with his death, it 
was, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, 
only a contributing factor and not the moving, pri-
mary or proximate cause of his death. Nor does this 
type of stress constitute an unexpected event, happen-
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ing or accident inflicting bodily injury. It is, there-
fore, apparent that the plaintiff failed to prove under 
any view of the evidence that Leonard Elton died as a 
result of accidental bodily injury directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes. 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE CONTRA-
DICTORY AND FAILED TO FAIRLY PRE-
SENT THE ISSUES TO THE JURY TO THE 
PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT 
The Instructions in this case were framed in 
such a manner as to make it appear to the jury that if 
Le'Onard Elton was working hard a:t the time of his 
death and that this in some way contributed to or 
hastened his death, plaintiff could recover under the 
insurance policy with the defendant. This is partic-
ularly illustrated by the Court's Instruction No. 10, 
which states: 
You are instructed that if you believe by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Leonard 
W. Elton was suffering from a cardiovascular 
disease, and that as a Judge he, at the time of 
his death, was under unusual mental stress 
and strain caused by an unusual amount of 
work or work causing unusual mental stress 
and strain, and that by chance, and without 
design, consent or cooperation of Leonard W. 
Elton, the stress or strain aggravated that di-
sease and proximately caused a cerebral 
thrombosis and that cerebral thrombosis under 
those circumstances, was the injury which 
proximately caused the death of Leonard W. 
Elton, then your verdict should be in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant. (R. 
80) 
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This Instruction, especially when read in con-
junction with the other Instructions which were given 
by the Court, is erroneous in a number of respects. In 
the first place, it fails to tell the jury that Judge Elton 
had to die as a result of an accidental bodily injury 
or the unforeseeable result df an intentional act, and 
it attempts to identify mental stress and strain 
caused by an unusual amount of work as an accident. 
It further tells the jury that the stress or strain need 
only contribute to the death of Leonard Elton in the 
sense that it aggravated his cardiovascular disease 
and does not tell them that the mental stress and 
strain must be the moving, sole, and proximate cause 
of the injury resulting in death. 'The only words at-
tempting to define accident in this instruction are the 
words "and that by chance, and without design, con-
sent or cooperation of Leonard W. Elton" the unusual 
mental stress and strain caused his death. This is com-
pietely inadequate as a definition of '·'accident" under 
the Utah law. "Accident" has little to do with the de-
sign, consent or cooperation of the insured. The criti-
cal issues are whether the event itself is accidental or 
whether the injury was the foreseeable consequence 
of the insured's acts. Nowhere in this Instruction is 
·foreseeablity alluded to. Nor was the term "accidental 
bodily injury" or "accident" ever defined by the In-
structions. The closest they come to a definition was 
in Instruction No. 9 which instucted the jury as fol-
lows: 
You are instructed that accidents are of 
two kinds; those that are not the result of hu-
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man action and those that are such result. 
Theref~re, an accident is an event which hap-
pen~ without any human agency, or, if hap-
penmg through human agency, an event which 
under the circumstances is unusual to and not 
expected by the person to whom it happens. 
(R. 79) 
This Instruction simply tells the jury that there 
are two kinds of accidents - those which are the re-
sult of human action and those which are not the re-
sult. The term "accident" implies some type of a hap-
pening or event and not just something unusual. At 
no time was this brought out even though the defen-
dant requested in its Requested Instruction No. 4, 
which was denied, that the Oourt so instruct the jury. 
Instruction No. 4 reads: 
In order for the plaintiff to recover in this 
action, the plaintiff must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence tha:t the death of Leon-
ard Elton on May 13, 1970, came about by rea-
son of some unexpected event or occurrence 
which in and of itselI and independently of 
all other causes caused sufficient damage to 
one of the organs of his body that he thereafter 
died as a result of such event or occurrence and 
injury. (R. 62) 
The Court refused to admit the policy of insur-
ance in evidence ( R. 38) . In fact, the Court told the 
jury in Instruction No. 7 that the exact wording of 
the policy was unimportant and refused to give the 
defendant's Requested Instruction No. 3, which at-
tempted to inform the jury on the type of policy which 
was involved; to define the terms of the policy; and 
to explain the circumstances under which the plain-
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tiff might be entitled to recover the benefits of the 
policy. In Instruction No. 8, the Court instructed the 
jury : "You are instructed that a cerebral thrombosis 
is a bodily injury." (R. 78). This is incorrect in that 
the cerebral thrombosis in this case was not a bodily 
injury, implying that the "accidental bodily injury" 
which the case concerned might be proven simply by 
proving that Leonard Elton died as a result of cer-
ebral thrombosis, which was not the case. The acci-
dental bodily injury which the case was concerned 
with was that event or occurrence which brought 
about the cerebral thrombosis and not the cerebral 
thrombosis itself. The Court's Instruction No. 16 in-
structs the jury: 
Where two causes combine to bring about 
an injury and either one of them operating 
alone would have been sufficient to cause the 
injury, either cause is considered to be a proxi-
mate cause of the injury if it is a material ele-
ment and was a substantial factor in bringing 
it about. (R. 86) 
As has been seen from the authorities in the fore-
going part of the defendant's brief, it is not sufficient 
for the plaintiff to merely prove that Leonard Elton 
may have died either as a result of a pre-existing di-
sease or as a result of an acidental bodily injury. She 
had the burden under this policy of insurance of prov-
ing that the alleged accidental bodily injury caused 
his death independently of other causes even though 
it may have acted through a pre-existing condition in 
doing so. In Instruction No. 12, the jury was in· 
structed: 
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You are instructed that it is no defense to this 
action that a normal person would not have 
died as a result of the injuries received and 
also it is not a defense to this action that Leon-
ard W. Elton at the time of his death was suf-
fering from arteriosclerosis. ( R. 82) 
This Instruction is incorrect when we consider 
the question as to whether or not Leonard Elton died 
as a result of the pre-existing disease or as a result 
of the accident. If Leonard W. Elton at the time of 
his death was suffering from arteriosclerosis to the 
extent that the disease caused his death, although it 
may have been contributed to by the stress, 
ft is a defense that a normal person would not 
have died as a result of this stress. In Instruction No. 
17, the jury was instructed as follows, which should 
be read in connection with Instruction No. 18, which 
said: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
You are instructed that negligence on the 
part of Leonard W. Elton is not a defense in 
this case and neither is voluntary exposure to 
danger such a defense. The policy of insurance 
here involved does not contain such a provision. 
Unless the decedent intended to produce 
the very result which occurred, to-wit, -his own 
death the element of danger is both unimpor-
tant ~nd imma:terial. (R. 87) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
You are instructed that whether or not 
Leonard W. Elton used good or bad judgment 
in connection with the amount of stress and 
strain to which he subjected himself prior to 
his death is immaterial. In this connection, if 
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you should find in accordance with these in-
structions that Leonard W. Elton suffered an 
accidental bodily injury as a result of unusual 
stress and strain which shortened his life it 
would be no defense, even if it were the fact, 
that he exercised bad judgment in subjecting 
himself to said stress and strain, if any. (R. 
88) 
We agree that under Utah law an accident may 
follow as a result of an intended or voluntary act 
when the results of that act are not the natural or 
probable result of the act itself. But what the Court 
has instructed the jury in Instruction Nos. 17 and 18 
is that if Leonard Elton knew that by continuing to 
work he might thereby hasten his own death, which 
well he might have known if we believe the testimony 
of Dr. Dalrymple, but nevertheless continued to work, 
the plaintiff may recover. It is hard to conceive how 
it can be said that Leonard W. Elton died as a result 
of an accident. If he knew, or reasonably should have 
known that if he continued to work he would 
die and yet he voluntarily continued to do so. 
These Instructions had no place in this lawsuit. 
As pointed out by the Kellogg case, supra, the test of 
foreseeability is not whether Leonard Elton could 
foresee his own death but whether or not in light of 
his physical condition his death was reasonably fore-
seeable by reason of the disease from which he was 
suffering. However, as given, they allow the plaintiff 
in this case to recover even though his death could 
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have been reasonably foreseen by Leonard Elton or 
anyone if he continued to work, which is clearly not 
the law. 
We are convinced that the jury in this case had 
no idea of the type of policy on which this action was 
brought or the circumstances under which the plain-
tiff was permitted to recover. They were not told 
about the policy by the Court. The net effect of what 
they were told was simply that if they found Leonard 
Elton was doing an unusual amount of work, causing 
an unusual amount of mental stress and strain, and 
that this somehow contributed to his death, the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover. This was clearly preju-
dicial. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of the plaintiff's claims and attempts to 
characterize the defendant's policy as a special risk 
policy, it is apparent that the policy involved in this 
case, although it may have been more liberal than 
other accident policies, was clearly a policy insuring 
the beneficiaries of Leonard Elton in the event he 
died as a result of an accidental bodily injury. It is 
submitted that the plaintiff failed to sustain her bur-
den of proof for the reason that as a matter of law 
there was nothing accidental or unforeseeable or un-
expected about Leonard Elton's death on May 13, 
1970. There was no accidental event or happening 
which brought it about. And even if we under some 
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kind of a strange construction attempted to define the 
stress and strain Leonard Elton may have been under 
immedately prior to the time of his dea:th as an acci-
dental event or happening, recovery must still be de-
nied because this stress and strain was not the pre-
dominant cause of his death. As demonstrated by the 
evidence, Leonard Elton died by reason of the natural 
progression of the disease of arteriosclerosis. That 
disease had progressed to the point where it had pro-
duced a heart attack sixteen years before his death. 
It is not surprising that the jury returned aver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff in this case in view of the 
Instructions of the Court. They had no idea of the 
type of insurance policy involved in this action. Under 
those Instructions the only elements which they had 
to find were that Leonard W. Elton was working 
hard at the time of his death and the fact that he was 
working played some role in his death on May 13, 
1970. 
It is submitted that under the law and the evi-
dence in this case the Oourt should have granted the 
defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict and dis-
missed the plaintiff's action and that this Court 
should reverse the trial court and direct that this case 
be dismissed. If we have failed to convince the Court 
of this, it at least appears that the issues in this case 
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were not fairly presented to the jury by the Court 
and that the verdict of the jury in this case should be 
set aside and the case returned to the District Court 
for a new trial. 
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